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Abstract
In this article we use the Clinton–Lewinsky scandal to illustrate a fundamental change in the contemporary
American media environment: the virtual elimination of the gatekeeping role of the mainstream press. The
new media environment, by providing virtually unlimited sources of political information (although these
sources do not provide anything like an unlimited number of perspectives), undermines the idea that there are
discrete gates through which political information passes: if there are no gates, there can be no gatekeepers.
This article is part of a larger project in which we argue that alterations in the media environment have eroded
the always uneasy distinction between news and entertainment. Overall, this erosion, one result of which is
the collapse of the gatekeeping function, is rapidly undermining the commonsense assumptions used by both
elites, citizens and scholars to understand the role of the media in a democratic society.
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A B S T R A C T
In this article we use the Clinton–Lewinsky scandal to illustrate a fundamental change
in the contemporary American media environment: the virtual elimination of the
gatekeeping role of the mainstream press. The new media environment, by providing
virtually unlimited sources of political information (although these sources do not
provide anything like an unlimited number of perspectives), undermines the idea that
there are discrete gates through which political information passes: if there are no
gates, there can be no gatekeepers. This article is part of a larger project in which we
argue that alterations in the media environment have eroded the always uneasy
distinction between news and entertainment. Overall, this erosion, one result of which
is the collapse of the gatekeeping function, is rapidly undermining the commonsense
assumptions used by both elites, citizens and scholars to understand the role of the
media in a democratic society.
K E Y W O R D S j Clinton–Lewinsky j Drudge j gatekeeping
j new media environment j new news j political scandal j scandal
The Clinton–Lewinsky scandal illustrates a fundamental change in the con-
temporary American media environment: the virtual elimination of the gate-
keeping role of the mainstream press. While most current understanding of
media and politics (held by scholars, citizens, and practitioners) assumes that
journalists can and/or should operate as the gatekeeper for politically relevant
information, the most profound impact of the new media environment may
well be the way it undermines the ability of any elite to play this central role.
The new media environment, by providing virtually unlimited sources of
political information (although these sources do not provide anything like an
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unlimited number of perspectives), undermines the idea that there are discrete
gates through which political information passes: if there are no gates, there
can be no gatekeepers. While we are certainly not the first to note the
changing role of journalists in this new media environment (see, most nota-
bly, Katz, 1993), we believe that the Clinton–Lewinsky scandal illustrates how
fundamental is this particular change in the role of the press.
While elites (political and media both) and academics, on the one hand,
have had a great deal of trouble making sense of Monica and Bill, the public,
on the other hand, seems to have had much less difficulty. The former groups’
difficulty in understanding the scandal stems from their failure to recognize
the increasingly limited ability of journalists to act as gatekeepers. The dis-
juncture between elite attempts to both control and understand the scandal,
on the one hand, and the conclusions which the public drew about this
political spectacle, on the other hand, speaks to some fundamental changes
which have occurred in the role of the press in American society as we move
into the 21st century.
This article is part of a larger project in which we try to make sense not just
of Monica and Bill, but of the alterations in the media environment over the
last 15 years and the implications of these changes for the role of the media in
American politics. Alterations in the media environment have eroded the
always uneasy distinction between news and entertainment. Overall, this
erosion, one result of which is the collapse of the gatekeeping function, is
rapidly undermining the commonsense assumptions used by both elites,
citizens and scholars to understand the role of the media in a democratic
society. As scholars and citizens ourselves, we are divided over the implications
of these changes for the state of American democracy. Optimistically, we
believe that the erosion of elite gatekeeping and the emergence of multiple
axes of information provide new opportunities for citizens to challenge elite
control of political issues. Pessimistically, we are skeptical of the abilities of
ordinary citizens to make use of these opportunities and suspicious of the
degree to which even multiple axes of power are still shaped by more funda-
mental structures of economic and political power.
In this article, we try to avoid the twin pitfalls of either seeing these
changes as so profound and revolutionary that they fundamentally alter the
political world, or of seeing them as incremental extensions of age-old features
of politics, hence signifying nothing new. In his own analysis of television and
journalism, Bourdieu (1998: 43) sees these pitfalls as two symmetrical illusions
to which social scientists are prone (and which ironically are made more
tempting by the desire of academics to publicize their views in the mass
media):
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On the one hand, there is the sense of something that has never been seen
before. (There are sociologists who love this business, and it’s very much the
thing, especially on television, to announce the appearance of incredible phe-
nomena or revolutions.) And, on the other hand (mostly from conservative
sociologists), there’s the opposite, ‘the way it always has been,’ ‘there’s nothing
new under the sun,’ ‘there’ll always be people on top and people on the bottom,’
‘the poor are always with us; and the rich too. . .’
The theoretical centrality of gatekeeping
To understand how significant is the erosion of the gatekeeping role, it is first
necessary to show how important is this idea to extant theories of the press
and political communications research. An especially influential conceptual-
ization of the role of the press in postwar American society, called ‘the social
responsibility theory’, was formulated by Peterson (1956). Responding to a
variety of social, political, and economic changes in the postwar era, Peterson
sought to reconcile the growing centralization of ownership and decreasing
competition in the printed press, the rise of an inherently centralized and
expensive electronic media, as well as social science research and real world
events which raised concerns regarding the stability of democratic systems and
the civic capacity of democratic citizens (Berelson, 1952; Schumpeter, 1942).
This new theory introduced (or reinforced) three significant conceptual
distinctions. First, the news media were separated from the entertainment
media, with the former viewed as most directly responsible for fulfilling the
media’s civic functions. Second, within the news media, fact would be dis-
tinguished from opinion, and news reporting would strive to be accurate,
objective, and balanced. Third, and most significant for this article, reflecting
arguments made much earlier by Lippmann (1922), the public was dis-
tinguished from media elites and policy experts, with the former viewed as
generally passive, easily manipulated consumers of information and the latter
as information gatekeepers who represented the public’s interest in the con-
struction of political and social reality.
In essence, the social responsibility theory conceded the inevitability of
both a centralized, privately owned media and of a less-than-engaged public,
and transferred much of the civic responsibility of the latter to a new class of
information elites. The ‘truth’ about the social and political world was no
longer (if, indeed, it ever had been) constructed out of enlightened public
discourse, but instead emerged from a more managed and limited exchange
among experts in the news media. Citizens were redefined as unsophisticated
consumers of information, and the public was redefined as an audience.
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The ability to maintain these distinctions and institutionalize professional
journalists as political gatekeepers was aided from the 1950s through the early
1980s by the relative lack of competition that had led to the development of
the social responsibility theory in the first place. For example, during this
period television viewers had the choice of watching one to five channels,
most or all of which broadcast news at the same time. The distinction of news
from non-news was also preserved by the underlying assumption that public
affairs programing would be free from the expectations of profitability. And it
was, somewhat ironically, maintained by the nature of the audience itself.
Readers of prestige news magazines and newspapers and viewers of public
affairs broadcasting were a self-selected segment of the population, a more
elite social, economic, and political strata of citizens. This elite audience
signaled the serious nature of the content, distinguishing it from ‘popular’
media. What developed were distinctions between the politically important
and the politically insignificant, based not on analyses of the actual political
content and aesthetic worth of media programing but rather upon the organi-
zation of producing institutions and the make-up of the audience.
Political communications researchers have wrestled with the implications
of the emergence of this media formation. They have found that, consistent
with ‘social responsibility’ theories of the press, the political agenda has been
shaped by the symbiotic relationship that has developed between mainstream
political actors and major news outlets (Bennett, 1988; Hallin, 1986: 115–119).
In this relationship, the mainstream news media act as a monolithic gate-
keeper, while a limited set of political elites vied with each other to shape this
agenda and how it was framed. Within this system, the public was often
reduced to a passive consumer, whose own attention to and interpretation of
events was constrained by this limited information environment.
The degree to which public opinion is actually shaped by the outcome of
this elite struggle has been explored by a generation of scholars. Employing a
wide variety of increasingly sophisticated empirical methods, mainstream
political communications researchers have found powerful and convincing
evidence that the media, acting as gatekeepers, exercise significant influence
on public opinion (e.g. Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Iyengar, 1994; Page and
Shapiro, 1992). However, it is important to recognize that this work assumes a
particular model of the media environment, described by the social responsi-
bility theory of the press, within which elites and citizens operate. If this
environment has changed, as we argue, then so too must our evaluations of
this body of research: it is, perhaps, historically accurate, but of limited
relevance today. Indeed, it is somewhat ironic that this model of political
communication, despite its relatively brief duration (the ‘golden age’ of
network news lasted only 20 years or so), has been taken by so many as the
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‘natural’ state of affairs against which all other models are judged.1 After
outlining the changes in the media environment which undermine both the
social responsibility theory of the press and the role of media as gatekeepers,
we use the Clinton–Lewinsky scandal to sketch the changing nature of the
impact of the media on public opinion.
The changing media environment and the breakdown of
gatekeeping
The media environment in the United States has changed dramatically in the
last 15 years, with the expansion of cable and satellite television, the growth of
the internet and world wide web, the horizontal and vertical integration of the
media through conglomerates, the general availability of VCRs and remote
television controls, and so forth. The new media environment is distinctive in
several ways: the increased volume of information that is available; the
increased speed with which information can be gathered, retrieved and trans-
mitted; the increased control given to consumers of the media; the fragmenta-
tion of media audiences and the resulting greater ability to target media
messages to particular audiences; the greater decentralization of certain as-
pects of the media; and the greater interactive capacity between consumers
and producers of media messages (Abramson et al., 1988; Katz, 1997). All told,
these changes constitute a reshaping of the media environment that easily
rivals those leading to the creation of the social responsibility theory and the
structural development of the media as gatekeeper.
These changes have made it difficult to maintain the always artificial
distinction between public affairs and ‘mere’ entertainment. Specifically, there
has been an erosion of the ‘walls’ constructed between the two types of media.
The division of media organizations into separate news, entertainment, and
sports divisions, while still in place, have become more porous. Journalists,
management executives, public officials, and entertainers develop celebrity
identities that transcend any specific genre and allow them to move freely
between these different genres. The distinction between ‘fact’ and opinion or
analysis is much less clearly identified by simple rules such as where it appears,
who is saying it, or how it is labeled. Public affairs ‘time slots’ have become
overwhelmed by the range of options open to citizens: traditional news can be
gotten any time of the day through cable or the world wide web, or equally
ignored at any time of the day. Even the informal standard operating pro-
cedures, routines, and beats that determined newsworthiness have come under
serious rethinking both from within and outside the journalistic profession
(Rosen, 1999). As audiences themselves absorb these changes and the erosion
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of formerly commonsense distinctions, they too begin to move freely between
genres eroding the gatekeeping ability of any single group of elites (e.g.
‘serious’ journalists or political leaders).
The mainstream press in its gatekeeping role operates along a single axis of
influence, determined by the interaction between political elites and journal-
ists. This point of interaction constitutes the gate through which information
passes to the public. However, the new media environment disrupts the single
axis system in three ways. First, the expansion of politically relevant media
and the blurring of genres leads to a struggle within the media itself for the
role of authoritative gatekeeper. Second, the expansion of media outlets, and
the obliterating of the normal news cycle has created new opportunities for
non-mainstream political actors to influence the setting and framing of the
political agenda (Kurtz, 1998). And, third, this changed media environment
has created new opportunities and pitfalls for the public to enter and interpret
the political world. Katz (1993), for example, in writing about media coverage
of the Gulf War, noted that 24-hour cable news outlets not only gathered news
as rapidly as possible, but also broadcast it as rapidly as possible, effectively
eliminating the role of editors in the news production process. This left
viewers themselves to try to sort out what was ‘really’ happening as the war
progressed.
In short, the new media environment creates a multiplicity of gates
through which information passes to the public, both in terms of the sheer
number of sources of information (i.e. internet, cable television, radio), the
speed with which information is transmitted, and the types of genres which
the public uses for political information (i.e. movies, music, docudramas, talk
shows). These changes create what John Fiske (1996: 65) calls a multiaxiality
which ‘transforms any stability of categories into the fluidities of power’.
While Fiske focuses on three axes of class, race, and gender in his analysis, the
concept of multiaxiality is useful for understanding the changing nature of
mediated political discourse more generally. So, in this new media environ-
ment, myriad gates through which information passes creates multiple axes of
power to influence public opinion.
In one sense, multiaxiality is similar to older libertarian models of the
press. In these pre-20th century models, relatively unfettered opportunity for
privately owned presses and few limits on what they published were assumed
to foster a market place of ideas. While the range and quality of information
available through the press was an important element of this ‘libertarian’
theory of the press (Siebert et al., 1956), equally important (though less often
articulated) was the belief that citizens had the ability, opportunity, and
motivation to actively participate in the civic and cultural marketplace. Just as
classical economic theory assumed an informed and rational consumer, so too
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libertarian press theory assumed a citizenry able to sort through and draw
rational conclusions from the booming, buzzing confusion of the marketplace
of ideas. In addition, the libertarian theory made few distinctions between
popular and elite information, between fact and opinion, between the enter-
taining and the informative, or between culture and politics. The ‘truth’ about
the social and political world did not emerge from the pages of newspapers
and pamphlets, but was constructed and constantly revisited through the
interaction of popular information and popular discourse.
Yet, the new multiaxial media environment is also quite different from
earlier models of the press and media influence, primarily because of the
centrality and omnipresence of the media itself. Libertarian and social respon-
sibility theories of the press assumed, either explicitly or implicitly, that the
political values citizens use to interpret information and the information itself
comes from a wide variety of sources of which the media itself is only one.
Much empirical communications research (often bundled together and labeled
the ‘minimal effects’ model) supports these assumptions by finding that the
media exercise only limited influence over basic political values (as evidenced
by the research on political socialization which operates through family,
school, friends, co-workers and so forth) and, due to limited interest, media
messages are filtered (via the two-step flow) through an attentive elite. This
neat distinction between the media and life outside the media is another
casualty of the new media environment. When we spend so much of our day
attending to the media, be it watching television, videotapes and movies,
cruising the internet, playing video games, listening to music and radio and so
forth, life ‘on the screen’ is no longer distinct from life ‘out there’. Increas-
ingly, the media in all their new forms are where we live. To paraphrase
Marshall McLuhan (1995: 272), ‘The new media are not bridges between
people and life; they are life. The new media are not ways of relating us to
“real” life; they are real life and they reshape real life at will’.2 It seems to us
that this creates a fundamentally new set of challenges for citizenship and
democracy unimagined by older theories of the press or much communica-
tions research.
At one level the collapse of gatekeeping represents a direct attack on the
elites – journalists, policy experts, public officials, academics, and the like –
who have served as the arbiters of social and political meaning under the social
responsibility theory. To some extent this responsibility is returning to the
public, as they play a more active role in constructing social and political
meaning out of the mix of mediated narratives with which they are presented.
We find much evidence of this in the public’s ability to make sense of the
Clinton–Lewinsky scandal. But in other ways, the media remain elite domi-
nated and the changes described here are simply alterations in the rules of the
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game, creating new venues through which traditional political elites attempt
to shape the political agenda in new ways. How able citizens are to search for
diverse sources of information and critically evaluate what they find is a
troubling question. We illustrate these contradictory tendencies and the press-
ing need for a new theory of the press that accounts for them by examining
the Clinton–Lewinsky media spectacle.
Sex, lies, and videotapes: a case study of the new media politics
The Clinton–Lewinsky scandal was the last in a long series of ‘bimbo erup-
tions’ that had plagued Bill Clinton throughout his political career.3 The
declining ability of political elites and the mainstream press to act as gate-
keepers along with the increasing role of alternative media sources can be
chronicled by comparing the responses of the Clinton campaigns and admin-
istrations (assuming there is still a difference between those two terms) and the
mainstream press to each successive accusation leveled by first Connie Ham-
zey, then Gennifer Flowers, then Paula Jones, then Kathleen Willey and finally
Monica Lewinsky. While we focus here on Bill Clinton, it would also be
interesting to analyze why allegations about his behavior became a staple of a
wide variety of media outlets and American public discourse, while allegations
about other politicians (e.g. long-running rumors about George Bush and
Newt Gingrich) did not cross the threshold into widely circulated stories or
public discussion.4 Clearly, there is room for a comparative sociology of
modern sex scandals and their coverage in the mass media.
Establishing a pattern that would repeat itself many times, the first
allegations about Bill Clinton surfaced in alternative media outlets. In
November of 1991 a Little Rock talk radio station aired accusations made by
Connie Hamzey (whose previous claim to fame had been that she was a well-
known rock and roll groupie) that she had been propositioned by then
Governor Bill Clinton in 1983. Hamzey’s accusations were originally made as
part of a Penthouse story about her which, by the way, also included nude
photos.5 Hamzey’s story was picked up by CNN Headline News.
The Clinton campaign’s response reflected the then still relatively intact
world of elite gatekeeping. Senior advisor George Stephanopoulos deployed
his ‘People will think you are scum’ strategy, later to be immortalized in the
‘documentary’ The War Room.6 This approach relies upon two features of
mainstream journalistic practice: ethical concerns over the propriety of cover-
ing the private lives of public figures and the need for on-the-record sources on
both sides of a story. So, while refusing to go on the record to even deny the
charges (since this would then provide two sides to the story and make it a
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legitimate topic), Stephanopoulos called CNN and ‘started screaming’ about
the propriety of the story while refusing to comment to other reporters who
called. Tellingly, this strategy also relies on the ability of the mainstream press
to act as the primary conduit of political information to the public. ‘It worked.
CNN dropped the story after a single mention, and none of the other networks
picked it up. . . We’d survived our first bimbo eruption’ (Stephanopoulos,
1999: 55). By 1998 and the Lewinsky scandal, none of these underlying
assumptions would still be valid and such strategies would consistently fail.
In mid-January of 1992, The Star, a national tabloid specializing in stories
about the personal lives of celebrities, published a series of stories in which
Gennifer Flowers claimed to have had a 12-year affair with Bill Clinton. Again,
the ‘People will think you are scum’ strategy seemed to work. The story was
initially downplayed in the mainstream press, in part because the allegations
were two years old, having been first made public while Clinton was Governor.
It was also initially ignored because The Star, described in one mainstream
newspaper article as better than most of the national tabloids but still a step
below The National Enquirer, was deemed an unreliable source.7
However, reflecting the proliferation of media outlets, the increasing
difficulty of distinguishing between mainstream and non-mainstream press
and the embarrassing existence of tape-recorded conversations between
Flowers and Clinton, the story would not go away. Fox news affiliates and the
New York Post both picked up the item (being both owned by Rupert Murdoch,
they provide evidence for supporters of Hilary Clinton’s claims of a vast right-
wing conspiracy – VRWC hereafter) and the ‘big feet’ press – The Wall Street
Journal and The Boston Globe – assigned reporters to the story.
Bill and Hillary Clinton’s decision to directly address the issue by appear-
ing on 60 Minutes right after the Super Bowl brought the issue more centrally
into the mainstream press. Noting the significance of this very new strategy,
Stephanopoulos (1999: 62) says that it was ‘. . . the media equivalent of
chemotherapy. 60 Minutes was strong enough to cure us – if it didn’t kill us
first’. The Clinton appearance helped to frame the issue for New Hampshire
voters as a referendum on the appropriate focus of the press and politics.
Despite CNN’s live coverage of Gennifer Flowers’ press conference the follow-
ing day, at which she played some of the tapes, the Clintons had succeeded
and the ‘comeback kid’ was born. Here we have a glimpse of the ability of the
public to distinguish between the entertainment value of disclosures (in a
variety of media outlets) about the private lives of public figures and their
perhaps dubious relevance for judging the public performance of politicians.
While the role of quasi-alternative media was increasing, the focus of
struggle still centered on the mainstream press. Even though the Clintons’
efforts were successful in rallying public support and partially diffusing the
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issue, the alleged affair had now gained legitimacy within the mainstream
press as a campaign issue. To justify their expanded coverage, members of the
press could point to the existence of legitimate sources (for example, the
Clintons themselves) and to the fact that other traditional news outlets were
covering the story. The press could also justify covering what was initially
defined as a private matter by focusing on the issue of ‘lying to the public’ – a
theme that would emerge time and again over the next seven years. Inter-
estingly enough, as the mainstream press devoted more and more coverage to
issues of scandal, the tabloid press ‘suffered from these incursions on its turf
. . . The National Enquirer, The Star and The Globe – each lost 30 percent in
circulation from 1991 to 1996’ (Gabler, 1998: 92).
At least two outcomes of the Flowers’ story are worth noting. First, the
proliferation of media outlets searching for political stories and using a wide
variety of approaches to define what constitutes a legitimate story erodes the
gatekeeping function of the mainstream press by making it more difficult to
exercise any control over what is covered.
To hold the line when everyone, including its own middle-class readers, was
already familiar with a story, when everyone seemed to think it was the biggest
story around, would have been foolish and self-defeating. The Flowers disclosure
was only the final station on this long road to conflation. (Gabler, 1998: 93)
Second, despite the sea changes occurring, journalists and political elites
remained locked in a set of practices which had been defined in the social
responsibility era of the press and assumed a continuing role for the main-
stream media as gatekeepers. That is, throughout the Paula Jones and Monica
Lewinsky scandals, journalists, editors, and political elites still negotiated with
each other over the appropriateness of particular stories and the frames they
would use as if the outcomes of such deliberations would still control the
political information available to the public.
This pattern within the mainstream press of initially ignoring, and then
reluctantly reacting to, issues initially raised in the non-traditional media was
also characteristic of the Paula Jones incident. While mainstream coverage
ebbed and flowed throughout most of 1994 (driven largely by events in the
civil suit), and largely disappeared throughout all of 1995 (as a result of legal
appeals that put much of the case on hold), non-mainstream coverage filled
the gaps in this coverage, keeping the issue firmly on its agenda.
So, initial stories about Paula Jones and Troopergate, written by a Los
Angeles Times reporter, were killed by editors until the story was published by
David Brock in the American Spectator, providing more support for VRWC
claims: Brock was infamous for his anti-Anita Hill stories and Clinton arch-
enemy Clint Jackson helped sell the story. The Troopergate stories, once in the
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alternative media, ‘forced’ the hand of the more mainstream Los Angeles Times,
which then ran their reporter’s stories (Isikoff, 1999: 15-16).
Similarly, no major network covered Jones’ first press conference in 1994
held at the Conservative Political Action Committee’s annual convention, nor
would The Washington Post print Michael Isikoff’s stories which largely con-
firmed Jones’ accusations. These decisions reflected the traditional elite-
dominated workings of the gatekeeping model: debates within news
organizations over the public’s right/need to know and negotiations with
political elites over the shape and content of what’s news. Of course, such
machinations are based on the increasingly dubious assumption that it is only
through the mainstream media that the public gets its political information.
In his own ‘tell-all’ book, Isikoff describes the debates within the Post
about the propriety of the story. If Isikoff is to be believed, debate was less over
whether the story was true (there seemed little doubt about that), but whether
the public should know (the essence of gatekeeping): ‘Editors always wanted to
know these things. They hardly ever wanted to publish them’ (Issikoff, 1999;
61). Another factor in the decision of the mainstream press to curtail coverage
of the Jones’ case were the actions of the White House. After personally
arguing with Isikoff, Stephanopoulos took his ‘you are scum’ strategy to the
next level and made a direct pitch to Post editor Len Downie ‘over crab cakes
in the dining room of the Jefferson Hotel’ (Stephanopoulos, 1999: 270).
In November of 1996 The American Lawyer published a long story which
chastised the press for its failure to explore more fully the Jones case. How do
we classify American Lawyer? Neither mainstream, conservative, nor fringe, it is
published by Steven Brill, who used the story as a way to gain publicity and
credibility for the magazine (see also, endnotes 3 and 5). While other main-
stream outlets did not bite on The American Lawyer, radio talk show host Don
Imus did and the Jones story began to receive regular coverage. Indeed, one of
the things that made negotiations between Clinton and Jones’ lawyers so
difficult was the demand by Jones for a public apology by the President that
would compensate for her continuous ‘sliming’ by entertainment figures like
Jay Leno, David Letterman, Howard Stern, and others (Isikoff, 1999: 179).
So, it was not until 1997 that the Paula Jones issue, which had been
essentially kept alive for the past three years by the non-mainstream press and
entertainment media, became an ongoing news story, driven largely by events
surrounding the civil suit and the heating up of rhetoric within both the
Clinton and the Jones camps. While in some ways this increased attention
suggests that the mainstream media had recaptured control of the political
agenda, most of the stories were initially generated through leaks, reports, and
rumors that first emerged over the internet, from conservative publications,
and/or from the cable talk shows. Thus, while the mainstream press had more
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firmly embraced the issue as newsworthy (the actions of political elites – e.g.
Clinton’s hiring of lawyer Robert Bennett to handle the Jones case – were
central to this decision), it was still reacting to an agenda that was being
framed largely by others. Mainstream news sources like the evening news and
the prestige newspapers were also disadvantaged by the collapse of the normal
twice-a-day news cycle and its rapid replacement with 24-hour-a-day breaking
news (Kurtz, 1998).
At this point in the story, all semblance of a distinction between main-
stream and alternative media sources begins to disappear as Matt Drudge
appears on the scene. Using the internet to publish insider tidbits about the
rich, famous, and powerful, Drudge saw himself as the new Walter Winchell.
This association is quite important because it reminds us, as would Bourdieu,
that we need to keep the new media environment in an historical perspective
and not overemphasize the uniqueness of developments. Gabler (1998: 151–2)
argues that Winchell is the prototype for the journalist as celebrity who blurs
the lines between news and entertainment to become a powerful force in
American public life. He traces Winchell’s lineage through Edward R. Murrow
and Barbara Walters (who, of course, was the lucky interviewer of Monica
Lewinsky). So, while Matt Drudge did not constitute a completely unique
figure, his use of the internet to disseminate his ‘scoops’ is significant for the
way it added a new wrinkle, further undermining the gatekeeping ability of
mainstream journalists.
While he may have been publicly excoriated by political and media elites
as the various Clinton scandals played out, he was embraced by those very
same elites as the ‘next big thing’. Isikoff met Drudge when he was squired
around the Newsweek offices by editor Howard Fineman. Indeed, Isikoff actu-
ally swapped information with him about the Starr investigation because ‘I, of
course, couldn’t let it look as if Drudge knew something I didn’t’ (Isikoff, 1999:
145). Fineman himself met Drudge at a dinner party in his honor hosted by
David Brock and attended by ‘. . . a star-studded cast of political and journal-
istic notables’ (Isikoff, 1999: 145). In any event, by combining the sensibilities
of a gadfly, a seemingly unquenchable hunger for celebrity, acceptance, and
power, and the opportunities for gaining access to a wide public presented by
the internet, more than any other figure in the Clinton saga, Drudge under-
mined the gatekeeping function of the mainstream press and political elites.
Indeed, the Agence France Presse, the world’s oldest wire service, listed
Drudge’s breaking of the Lewinsky story on 19 January 1998 as one of the 10
key dates in 20th-century media history (Grossman, 1999).
In July 1997, lawyers for President Clinton and Paula Jones were on the
verge of a settlement which would have effectively ended the Kathleen
Willey and, most likely, the Monica Lewinsky scandals before they started. At
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the same time, Isikoff, after being tipped off by Jones’ lawyers and helped by
the Clinton-conspiracy Guarino Report (more VRWC evidence) was hot on the
trail of Kathleen Willey, but consistent with the strictures of the mainstream
press had little faith that his story would be printed. However, Drudge broke
the story on 29 July and the leak exploded the Willey story into the main-
stream media and effectively ended the negotiations between the President
and Jones’ lawyers.
Isikoff captures the frustration of mainstream reporters, which would of
course repeat itself in the Lewinsky story. Internal negotiations within the
magazine over whether to publish his story reflected the old assumptions of
media gatekeeping. Editors and reporters wanted to make sure that ‘informa-
tion would hold up if and when Newsweek decided there was something worth
sharing with the public’ (Isikoff, 1999: 234–5, emphasis added). Drudge’s leak
revealed the futility and out-datedness of such deliberations.
Only a few days earlier, we had no intention of writing a story about Kathleen
Willey. Were we – as some critics later charged - using a scurrilous Internet gossip
columnist as a pretext for publishing something that didn’t meet the magazine’s
usual standards for what is fit to print? It was a tough call. (Isikoff, 1999: 155)
By January 1998, as another leak by Drudge aired the content of another
Isikoff Newsweek story which had been spiked, the Clinton presidency stood at
the brink of dissolution, rocked by another sex scandal and another con-
troversial Star(r) report – this time that of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr
– focusing on an alleged affair between President Clinton and a White House
intern, Monica Lewinsky. Isikoff’s (1999) account of the weekend when the
Drudge Report broke the story is a surreal commentary on the complete
obliteration of the boundaries between the mainstream press and other media
outlets. After losing the battle with his editors to run the story, he found out
about Drudge’s leak and rebuked Bill Kristol for referring to it on the Sunday
television talk show ABC This Week: ‘How could he rely on anything that guy
writes? (p. 340). Isikoff wondered, ‘Will the story break out into the main-
stream?’ (p. 341). When the story did ‘break out’ on Tuesday, Newsweek
decided to post Isikoff’s original story on its web-site. Here we are truly
through the looking glass of the new media environment and the hyperreality
of the modern political spectacle as a reporter, who knows the story to be true,
rebukes those who talk about it on television because they rely on a ‘bottom-
feeding’ source, wonders if it will make it into the mainstream after it has been
on television (a medium on which Isikoff himself appears regularly – he cut
short an earlier meeting with Linda Tripp to appear on Chris Mathews’s
Hardball) because it is not truly a ‘real’ event until it has made it into the
mainstream print press (albeit the internet version of the magazine).
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For all of the attention generated by the Paula Jones case, it paled in
comparison to the explosion of coverage in January of 1998. The last 10 days
of that month generated more newspaper stories around the country than all
the articles and commentaries written on all the eruptions from Connie
Hamzey to Kathleen Willey combined. While journalists continued to period-
ically stop and reflect on whether or not this was a topic worthy of this
amount of attention, or to lament the decline in journalistic standards in
reporting, they had by this time succumbed to the new system. Matt Drudge
emerged as a prominent commentator on ‘serious’ television shows like Meet
the Press (where he appeared with Isikoff). At the same time, journalists and
news reporters frequently appeared on talk shows. Following the lead of
Newsweek, mainstream publications like The New York Times, and The Wash-
ington Post ‘pre-published’ and updated their stories on the internet. Other
news (and sometimes non-news) outlets became sources for their stories. The
commentary of comedians like Jay Leno, David Letterman, Bill Maher, and Al
Franken became the topic of stories on the evening news and in the major
daily newspapers, while the news stories broadcast or published that day were
the subject of that evening’s monologue.
With Clinton–Lewinsky all notions that one could make clear cut distinc-
tions between serious and less serious news outlets, even between news and
non-news genres had been effectively destroyed. Whether one started the day
by listening to National Public Radio or Howard Stern, by watching Good
Morning America or CNN, by reading The New York Times or The Star, the topic
was the same. Viewers of daytime talk shows such as NBC’s Leeza could watch
a panel consisting of a Washington newspaper correspondent, a public rela-
tions expert who works with celebrities, a gossip columnist, and a television
star who had gone through a very public divorce discuss the way Hillary
Clinton was handling the media spotlight. An internet search under the
heading ‘Monica Lewinsky’ would produce over 12,000 options, ranging from
the latest news report to the ‘Monica Lewinsky Fan Club’ to the pornographic
web site ‘Monica Ate My Balls’ (In fact, internet search engines have become
one of the more significant gatekeepers in the new media environment and
their operations, while little studied, hold increasing political significance.)8
Emails sharing the latest Clinton/Lewinsky jokes were commonplace in offices
around the country. The early evening local and national news competed not
only with each other, but with the Drudge Report (50,000 hits per day at the
height of the scandal, a large proportion of which were mainstream journalists
themselves) and television tabloid shows like Entertainment Tonight, Hard Copy
and A Current Affair (the latter two whose names had taken on interesting
double meanings) for the latest details and interpretations of the scandal.
Prime-time dramas and comedies either made direct references to the scandal,
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or their usual fare of sex, infidelity, power, and conspiracy took on new
meanings. Cable talk shows like Hardball and Rivera Live, and all-news cable
networks like MSNBC, became virtually ‘all-Monica, all the time’. Late evening
news was no different, to be followed into the wee hours by more ‘discussion’
of the scandal by news anchor Ted Koppel, comedians Jay Leno, David
Letterman, Bill Maher, and Conan O’Brien, and ‘cross-over’ personalities like
sportscaster-turned-newscaster Keith Oberman. One could literally spend 24
hours a day watching, listening to, and reading about the Clinton scandal.
More tellingly, one could do so without ever tuning in or picking up a
traditional news source.
Reflecting the ability of the new media to obliterate both time and space,
the story flowed across national borders, where it also crossed genres and
audiences. For example, while ‘serious’ commentary in Israeli newspapers
focused on the impact of the scandal on prospects for a Middle East peace
settlement, commercials for spot removers on Israeli television spoofed the
scandal – private detectives searching Lewinsky’s closet are distressed to find a
can of the advertiser’s spot remover lying next to ‘the’ dress. Similarly, the
scandal both dominated the mainstream British press and was also used in
commercials to sell a newspaper’s weekly job listings (a Clinton impersonator
asks his aide why he should be interested in the new job listings, since he
already has a job. After a pause, he says, ‘Oh yeah, maybe I should take a
look’).
Films like Wag the Dog, Primary Colors, and An American President, or
television shows like Spin City, are direct commentaries on the current state of
politics, many of which have become part of the discourse about the Clinton–
Lewinsky scandal. For example, when the US bombed a Sudanese pharmaceut-
ical plant that was allegedly manufacturing chemical weapons, Kenneth Starr
was asked by a reporter whether he had seen Wag the Dog (in which a fictional
president creates a fake war as a diversion from a sex scandal) and if he saw any
parallels. If he did not, Sadam Huessein did and, earlier in the year, Iraqi
television broadcast a pirated copy of the movie at the height of tensions over
UN weapons inspections and US threats to launch air strikes. And an MSNBC
story noted that a statement by President Clinton explaining his initial
concerns over ordering the strike was eerily similar to one made by the
fictional president in An American President under similar circumstances.
And what of the public in this new, multiaxial environment? In some
ways, as we argued previously, this environment is evocative of the libertarian
era, in which multiple points of view exist, the line between opinion and fact
is less distinct, and, as J.S. Mill (1975) suggested, the ‘truth’ emerges from its
collision with error in the process of public deliberation. The substance of the
issue aside, the ability of a nation of 250 million people (to say nothing of the
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world-wide audience) to follow the Clinton–Lewinsky scandal through a host
of different media and genres (from straight news to talk shows to satire), and
then discuss it and the variety of more fundamental issues it raises with fellow
citizens, is a remarkable occurrence. Many aspects of the internet, such as its
interactivity, scope, and the ability for all users to become producers as well as
consumers of information and opinion, contribute to this deliberative process.
Even more mundane technology like remote controls and VCRs allows the
public to play a more active role in creating their own narratives out of the
already hyperreal media discourse. 
In essence, elements of the current media environment give the public
new ways, as a collectivity and as separate social, economic, political, and
cultural communities, to potentially become one (or more) of the axes of power
in what Fiske (1996: 7) describes metaphorically as ‘a river of discourses’:
At times the flow is comparatively calm; at others, the undercurrents, which
always disturb the depths under even the calmest surface, erupt into turbulence.
Rocks and promontories can turn its currents into eddies and counter-currents,
can change its direction or even reverse its flow. Currents that had been flowing
together can be separated, and one turned on the other, producing conflict out of
calmness. These are deep, powerful currents . . . and these discursive ‘topics’ swirl
into each other – each is muddied with the silt of the others, none can flow in
unsullied purity or isolation. Media events are sites of maximum visibility and
maximum turbulence.
Certainly the public’s reaction to the Clinton–Lewinsky scandal could be
interpreted from this neo-libertarian (Fiske would describe it as post-modern)
perspective. The evidence from public opinion surveys and media-market
analyses suggests that the public followed the ongoing story (through a variety
of media) and knew the central issues and ‘facts’. At the same time, and despite
the efforts of the President’s supporters and detractors to frame the issue, a
large majority of the public has created their own narrative that is consistent
with neither group’s interpretation: the President had an affair and lied about
it to the public and in his deposition and testimony (despite his denials). This
affair (and the other allegations of sexual misconduct) has damaged their
belief in Clinton’s moral character (despite his attempts to salvage his image).
At the same time, and despite the concerted efforts of Clinton’s detractors,
they have consistently separated this issue from his ability to govern, have said
that this is centrally a private matter, and opposed resignation or impeach-
ment, while favoring either dropping the issue or some form of censure. From
this perspective, the large audiences for scandal coverage only indicate that
the public found the issue entertaining and took pleasure (in a wide variety of
ways) from following it, but managed to keep the story in a more reasonable
perspective than either the mainstream media or political elites. In many
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ways, it was precisely the undeniably entertaining and amusing aspects of this
story that the mainstream were unable to address as they hypocritically
exploited it:
The news journalists themselves obviously couldn’t admit this. They spent the
first weeks of the Lewinsky story desperately trying to justify their coverage of it
by insisting that it was a matter of grave national concern. But the public knew
better. With President Clinton’s approval rating high and with his alleged
behavior having demonstrably had no effect on his ability to govern, the public,
in television ratings and polls, made two things clear: (1) they loved hearing
about the Lewinsky affair, but (2) they believed the affair had no relevance to
anything beyond itself. It was, in short, entertainment. (Gabler, 1998: 94)
While in the end the scandal certainly eroded the President’s ability to govern,
negative public reaction to the impeachment proceedings and the outcomes of
the 1998 elections illustrate the inability of the President, his opponents or the
mainstream press to control and shape events.
The ability of the public to participate in this deliberation without being
fully manipulated by it, results, we would argue, from the media environment
discussed throughout this paper, especially the declining ability of mainstream
journalists and political elites to act as gatekeepers and agenda-setters. In this
environment one could turn to the news (in the papers, on television, or over
the internet) to get the latest facts and rumors. One could watch Geraldo
Rivera defend the President night after night, and/or Chris Matthews attack
him (both doing so in the context of talk shows that included guests with
various points of view). One could watch the issue being described in grave
legal and constitutional terms on C-Span, in human and humourous terms on
The Tonight Show, or in a mix of both on Politically Incorrect. One could find out
how people across the world interpret our apparent obsession. And one could
access primary sources (for example, the Clinton testimony or the Starr
report).
And yet there is another side to this new information environment.
Regardless of Bill Clinton’s survival and the public repudiation of many of his
Republican adversaries, the ability of the administration’s opponents to cap-
ture the media agenda (if not fully capture how that agenda was framed)
succeeded in turning the public’s and the government’s attention away from
other, more substantive issues, preventing the Clinton administration from
taking advantage of what was arguably a very favorable political and economic
climate. In addition, what we previously interpreted as the public’s fairly
reasoned deliberation about the Clinton–Lewinsky scandal has an alternative
explanation: the attraction is driven by the same kind of morbid fascination
that leads to ‘rubber-necking’ when there is a traffic accident. In this inter-
pretation of the public mood, the hyperreality is more hyper than real, and
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there is little difference between the public’s attention to and discussion about
this issue than when a particularly exciting episode of ER or The X-Files is aired.
The fact that the public’s reaction to charges of sexual harassment in the Paula
Jones or Katherine Willey cases, or to alleged campaign finance violations by
the Clinton–Gore campaign were similar to that expressed in the Monica
Lewinsky case (yes he/they probably did it; everybody does it; the economy is
ok for me; nothing can be done to fix these things; so let’s move on) suggests
that the current media and political environments are contributing to a rising
cynicism rather than a rebirth of reasoned deliberation.
Determining which of these interpretations (or more likely what combina-
tion of them) is the more accurate is the crucial issue facing students of media
and politics, as well as anyone concerned about the current and future state of
democracy. To accomplish these tasks we need new perspectives on and
theories of the press in a democratic society that take account of the dramat-
ically changing media environment.
Conclusion: making sense of Monica and rethinking the new
media environment
What changed between 1992 and 1998 reveals much about the new ways in
which politics, the media, political elites, and the public interact. It seems very
clear that any approach to political communication based upon clear-cut
distinctions between fact and opinion or public affairs and entertainment
cannot hope to understand the mediated politics of the end of the 20th
century.
The new media environment presents a challenge to mainstream journal-
ists in their gatekeeping role as agenda-setter and issue-framer. It is telling that
throughout the Clinton–Lewinsky scandal and its precursors, the mainstream
press frequently paused to reflect on is own role, and to try to clarify (for itself
and the public) what constitutes newsworthiness.9 But the existence of multi-
ple news outlets (cable news/talk shows, radio call-in shows, conservative
publications like American Spectator), semi-news outlets (Hard Copy, A Current
Affair), entertainment media (The Tonight Show, Late Night with David Letter-
man), and the internet (most notably, the Drudge Report), all kept the issue alive
and pressured both the mainstream press and political elites to respond.
One result was the collapse of anything like a daily news cycle. While
reporters still struggled to ‘move the story forward’ they did so in an environ-
ment where that story was being updated every 20 minutes. The predictable
result was less time to reflect on what they were doing, more mistakes, and a
reduced ability to correct those mistakes. Never has the trade-off between
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getting it first and getting it right been so clear. While Katz (1993) noted this
process for CNN during its coverage of the Gulf War, by 1998 the pressure to
broadcast as well as gather news continuously had spread well beyond the
cable news networks.
In short, in the 6-year period from the publication of The Star expose to
the publication of the Starr report, mainstream journalism lost its position as
the central gatekeeper of the nation’s political agenda. For most of that period
(at least until 1997 and arguably until 1998) the mainstream news media
attempted to play a traditional role and found that the political agenda was
being set without them. More recently they have adapted to the new rules by
increasingly mimicking the form and substance of their competitors. In this
new environment, however, it seems unlikely that any strategy will return the
traditional news sources to the pre-eminent position they once held. The new
multiaxial reality is that much as political parties lost their place as the central
actor in electoral politics, instead becoming one of several sites where politics
occurs, traditional journalists are now one among many agenda-setters and
issue-framers within the media.
Just as the new information environment created multiple axes of power
within the media, it also created new axes among the political actors who
operate to shape the media’s agenda. Under the social responsibility theory,
authoritative sources were traditionally limited to a largely mainstream polit-
ical, economic, and social elite: elected officials, spokespersons for major
interest groups, and so forth. These sources, while attempting to shape the
media environment in ways that would benefit their particular political
agenda, understood and largely operated within the rules of traditional jour-
nalism. But the new media environment, with its multiple points of access and
more continuous news cycle has increased the opportunities for less main-
stream individuals and groups to influence public discourse.
As Fiske (1996), Lipsitz (1990) and others have noted, this can sometimes
lead to giving a voice to traditionally disempowered cultures and classes;
however, it can also, as in the case of the Clinton scandals, lead to the capture
of the political agenda by arguably unrepresentative interests. While perhaps
falling short of Hillary Clinton’s VRWC claim, as we have noted earlier, from
the start, the attacks on Bill Clinton’s financial and sexual behavior were
supported by individuals and groups associated with the religious and partisan
right, as well as by individuals who had a more personal vendetta against the
President. The religious right as well played an important role in maintaining
the momentum of the anti-Clinton campaign.10
Three points are of particular importance regarding this loosely knit
network of conservative foundations, public officials, private citizens, and
media organizations. First, while they undoubtedly had some tacit support
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among more mainstream conservatives and Republicans, by and large they
operated outside the normal chain of command and often were viewed with
suspicion and were publically opposed by their more moderate and/or politi-
cally powerful colleagues. This was essentially an insurgency movement by the
far right that was able to influence the public agenda through newly emerging
axes of mediated political power. While generally failing in more traditional
institutional settings (e.g. the courts), they have succeeded in influencing the
political agenda by exploiting the new media environment through first using
the right-wing press, then the non-mainstream press (the internet, cable talk
shows, etc.), and ultimately the mainstream press.11
The larger point is not that the new media environment favors con-
servative causes. Certainly the Clinton administration and its supporters have
proven effective at using some of the same techniques in getting their side of
the story into the liberal, non-mainstream, and mainstream press (one need
only consider the concerted efforts to damage the reputations of Gennifer
Flowers, Paula Jones, Katherine Willey, and to a lesser extent Monica Lewinsky,
or the revelations of sexual misconduct by the President’s critics). Nor is it to
suggest that, for different issues, more than one new axis of power might not
emerge (for example, imagine how the Clinton scandals might have played
out if feminists had played a more visible, active role). Rather it is to suggest
this new media environment, and the hyperreality it produces, has created
new, multiple, and shifting axes of political power.
At the very least, the new media environment decisively shifts the nature
of arguments about what the public has the right to know. Under the social
responsibility model, such debates are matters of negotiation among elites.
Political elite spin doctors like George Stephanopoulos and James Carville
negotiated with mainstream journalists to keep the supposedly private affairs
(literally) of the President out of the media. Reporters and editors debated
amongst themselves if and when there is something worth sharing with the
public. Lawyers for the accusers and the accused negotiated legal settlements
that prevented anyone from talking to the press or the public. Whether we
ultimately believe that the public ought to know whether or not the President
of the United States exposed himself to Paula Jones, groped Kathleen Willey,
received oral sex from Monica Lewinsky or not, such debates are no longer
likely to remain within elite circles. Instead, debates in the new media
environment will center on the ability of the public and elites (political and
media) to openly negotiate and construct a meaningful boundary between
public and private life; entertainment and serious political issues; fact and
opinion and so forth which can withstand the public disclosure of informa-
tion that would have remained hidden under earlier models of political
communication.
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We close by noting a fundamental objection to our argument: how
generalizable is coverage of the Clinton–Lewinsky scandal for political com-
munication in general? After all, it might be argued, a juicy sex scandal is
tailor-made for crossing the boundaries between different types of media and
for capturing the public’s attention. We answer this argument by contending
that the Clinton–Lewinsky scandal, in many ways, may actually understate the
dramatic changes in the media environment. We say this because the scandal
is an excellent example of a media event having the power to call a virtual
‘time out’ from everyday life by focusing public attention on a single pressing
event (Dayan and Katz, 1994). In such events, virtually all of the media,
regardless of genre, and the public discourse flowing from it, focuses on the
same issue: the death of Princess Diana, the O.J. Simpson case, the Clarence
Thomas–Anita Hill Hearings are examples.12
In this kind of media event, as in the Clinton–Lewinsky scandal (Dayan
and Katz would distinguish between breaking coverage of the scandal itself,
and the more scripted ritual of the impeachment proceedings, see endnote 12),
while various media may cover the issue in very different ways, underlying
assumptions about the structure of the public agenda are shared across all
these outlets and audiences, whether they be the CBS Nightly News, Jay Leno,
or a commercial for a spot remover. The more typical case, when there is no
overriding media event leading to such convergence, may be a much more
fundamental fracturing of the ability of the mainstream press or any other
institution to define a public agenda. On such ‘ordinary’ days, the Nightly
News, viewed by a shrinking and aging audience, may address events in
Kosovo or the theft of American nuclear secrets by China, while a more
youthful and expanding audience of internet surfers ponder the latest from
the Drudge Report or more specifically focused on-line sites, and small seg-
mented cable television audiences watch docudramas, melodramas, or com-
edies dealing with a wide range of more or less politically significant issues.
Just as elites can lose control of media events, the more ordinary daily
contours of the new media environment make it more difficult for elites to
focus public attention (i.e. set the political agenda). So, while the mainstream
press and political elites paid daily attention to the NATO air campaign against
Yugoslavia, this was not a topic of central importance on the myriad of
alternative sources of political information (outlets which had paid much
attention to the Clinton–Lewinsky scandal).13 Indeed, one indication of how
altered the media environment has become over the last several years is
evidenced by the ability of the media to set the agenda in the case of the 1991
air campaign against Iraq and the failure to do so in the air war of 1999.
As a result, we would hypothesize that the public is less interested and
absorbs less mediated information about this instance of the use of American
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military force than would have been the case under the social responsibility
model of the press or would have been predicted by extant models of agenda-
setting and priming in political communications. This poses new challenges
for political elites who depend upon the media’s ability to mobilize the
population by turning military actions into political spectacles, since the new
media environment enhances the ability of the public to simply not pay
attention (Edelman, 1995). Interestingly enough, one of Slobodan Milosevic’s
miscalculations may have been his expectation that American public opinion
would turn quickly against the bombings as CNN and other outlets showed
nightly shots of the devastation it was causing (Ignatieff, 1999: 75). What he
failed to anticipate was that the American public would be watching, instead,
stories about the Columbine High School14 shootings and docudramas about
Jessie Ventura, Joan of Arc and Michael Landon aired as part of attempts to
attract audiences during May sweeps month.
At the very least, then, making sense of Monica and the new media
environment within which she achieved her notoriety requires a more subtle
and nuanced notion of political power than that which underlies social
responsibility models of the press and the methods of political communica-
tion scholars.
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Notes
1 We are indebted to John Zaller for making this point.
2 The actual quote from McLuhan is: ‘The new media are not bridges between man and
nature; they are nature. . . . The new media are not ways of relating us to the old world;
they are the real world and they reshape what remains of the old world at will.’
3 Interestingly enough, for the purposes of this paper, the phrase ‘bimbo eruption’ is
usually attributed to Betsy Wright, a former Clinton chief of staff, who was charged
with investigating and undermining the credibility of his accusers. She (or at least a
thinly disguised version of her) was played by Kathy Bates, in an academy award
nominated performance, in the movie Primary Colors.
4 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point.
5 The difficulty of classifying media outlets is an interesting problem. Is Penthouse a
mainstream publication? Fifteen years ago, the answer would likely have been ‘no’,
especially in academic and elite circles. However, as Larry Flynt and Hustler threaten to
‘out’ the sexual escapades of conservative politicians and hence play a significant role
in American politics (i.e. the rapid exit from the stage of incoming House Speaker Bob
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Livingstone), Penthouse begins to seem positively conservative by comparison, to say
nothing of the information cycling and recycling on the internet.
6 Reflecting the difficulty of distinguishing between different media genres, we set off
the term documentary in quotation marks. For a fascinating account of the ways in
which this movie is less a documentary than a new form of political communication,
reflecting a carefully crafted strategy by the Clinton campaign, see Pary-Giles and Pary-
Giles (1999).
7 Again, reflecting the increasing difficulty of classifying media outlets, The National
Enquirer’s own reputation had been enhanced and begrudgingly acknowledged by
members of the mainstream press as a result of its reporting during the O.J. Simpson
trial.
8 See, for example, an interesting critical analysis of the ways in which search engines
are becoming increasingly commercialized and its implications for the information
their users are likely to recover (Rosenberg, 1999).
9 Recent attempts by the news media to ‘police’ itself also point to this crisis in defining
journalism: for example, the firing of several reporters and columnists at The Boston
Globe and The Washington Post for inaccurate reporting; the resignation of a local
newscaster in protest over the hiring of talk show host Jerry Springer; the decision by
ABC to not air a docudrama by Oliver Stone about the downing of TWA Flight 800 out
of fear that it would confuse viewers; the ongoing criticism of ‘public journalism’ by
mainstream members of the press; and so forth.
10 The Christian Defense Coalition contributed to the Paula Jones suit by setting up the
‘Paula Jones Legal Expenses Fund’. Other religious, conservative and/or Republican
individuals and groups such as Gilbert Davis (who had supported George Bush in
1988), the Legal Affairs Council (which had originally been set up to help defend
Oliver North during the Iran–Contra scandal), and the Rutherford Institute (a not-for-
profit organization that focuses on issues of religious freedom) also pledged contribu-
tions to aid in Paula Jones’ defense.
11 The Republican losses in the 1998 congressional elections, resulting in part from their
failed strategy regarding the Clinton–Lewinsky scandal, and the subsequent melt-
down within the GOP leadership, point to the extent to which mainstream members
of the party had lost control of their own agenda.
12 We are using a more inclusive definition of media event than the one developed by
Dayan and Katz. They include as part of their definition that media events must be
scheduled (so, they distinguish between the Kennedy assassination, not a media event
because unscheduled, and the Kennedy funeral, a media event because scheduled).
They include this restriction because they are interested in the ability of the media to
work in conjunction with the state to bring together the entire public in celebrations
of reintegration. In contrast, we are focusing on media events which, because of the
new media environment, hold the dramatic potential for elites to lose control of the
event and its interpretation by the public.
13 For instance, while an internet search under Monica Lewinsky produces a riot of
different kinds of web-sites from the strictly mainstream to the pornographic, a search
under Kosovo produces only a list of news stories. What determines which issues
become political events and which do not is an interesting avenue for study.
14 In an interesting twist on the accusations that usually pass between mainstream press
outlets and alternative sources of political information, Matt Drudge published an
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article skewering the press for its celebrations over the increased ratings that it
garnered in covering the Columbine shooting:
Late on Tuesday NBC spokeswoman Barbara Levin broke out the digital champagne
and poured a press release on the wires celebrating dramatic audience increases for
NBC News at the height of last week’s school slaughter.
‘As the nation focused on the school shooting tragedy in Littleton, Colorado. . .
Nightly News posted double digit viewer growth in both total viewers and homes’,
bragged Levin. . .
MSNBC [and CNN] followed the example and issued [their] own shocking press
release[s] claiming viewership records had been set during the bloodbath. . .
if only the shooting would never end (Drudge Report, 1999).
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